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Abstract
Previous research exploring the eﬀect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we
consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties
to be sensitive to firms’ prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency
program necessarily makes collusion more diﬃcult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs - such as in the U.S. - can make collusion easier compared to
oﬀering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a
leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.
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Introduction

One of the most important policy developments in antitrust policy in recent decades is
the revision of the Corporate Leniency Program by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
in 1993. Originally instituted in 1978, this program allows corporations and individuals,
who were engaging in illegal antitrust activity (such as price-fixing), to receive amnesty
from government penalties. This means that a corporation can avoid government fines,
while individuals escape fines and prison sentences. The 1993 revision made it possible
for amnesty to be awarded even when an investigation had been started and made it
a condition that the DOJ “has not received information about the illegal activity being
reported from any other source.” This means that amnesty is limited to one firm per cartel.
Leniency programs have proliferated as the European Commission instituted one in 1996
and an increasing number of industrialized countries have some form of leniency program.
While it is diﬃcult to assess the role of these programs on cartel formation and collapse,
we do know that it has been widely used. Notable examples include Rhône-Poulenc in
the vitamins case, Christie’s in the fine arts auctions case, and Carbide/Graphite in the
graphite electrodes case.1
In light of the influence of leniency programs, it is not surprising that there has been
a growing amount of research exploring how such programs destabilize collusion. Recent
work includes Aubert, Kovacic, and Rey (2003), Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003),
Feess and Walzl (2004), Motchenkova (2004), and Harrington (2005a). This research has
generally shown that leniency does reduce cartel stability. In the context of a stationary
environment (that is, the probability of conviction without use of the leniency program is
fixed over time), Spagnolo (2003) shows that, if there is a budget-balancing constraint, a
first-best solution can be achieved by giving the first firm to come forward a reward equal
to the fines levied on the remaining firms. Motta and Polo (2003) allow the probability
of conviction to stochastically change over time though it is restricted to take only two
values, one of which is zero (which corresponds to the event that there is no investigation). Their analysis provides qualified support for leniency. In some cases, waiving a
suﬃciently high fraction of penalties can prevent cartel formation, in which case such a
policy is optimal. However, if it cannot prevent cartel formation then no leniency should
be provided. Harrington (2005a) also allows the probability of detection and conviction to
vary over time but it can take any value from [0, 1] . This introduces a new eﬀect absent
1A

good review of the status of leniency programs is provided in “Hard Core Cartels” (2003). A critical

description of the U.S. program can be found in Kobayashi (2001).

2

from Motta and Polo (2003) which has the implication that, under certain conditions,
more leniency can enhance cartel stability. It is then possible for partial leniency to be
optimal though plausible suﬃcient conditions are provided for it to be optimal to waive
all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should
be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even
when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony.
A common limitation to all of this research is that the impact of leniency programs is
explored in a restrictive setting: The stage game modelling oligopolistic interaction is the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. This means that the collusive price and profit are fixed, as are the
price and profit associated with a firm cheating on the cartel. It has the implication that
the probability of the cartel being discovered is exogenous to how the cartel behaves as is
the penalty in the event of discovery and successful prosecution. All of these restrictions
aﬀect the influence of a leniency program. While a leniency program may be able to
prevent cartel formation, by fiat it cannot impact the cartel price in the event a cartel
forms. Furthermore, while a leniency program may prevent cartel formation when the
collusive price path is fixed (as it is with the Prisoners’ Dilemma), it may not be able to do
so if firms can strategically adjust the cartel price path so as to counteract the destabilizing
eﬀect of a leniency program. Previous work has shown that leniency programs destabilize
cartels by tightening the incentive compatibility constraint and the issue is to what extent
can a strategically-minded cartel counteract it by appropriately lowering the proposed
collusive price path.
The objective of this paper is to explore the implications of the corporate leniency
program in a rich dynamic model that endogenizes the prices that firms charge and allows
the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to those prices. With this
model, we can re-examine the central question thus far explored in the leniency program
literature: Do leniency programs make collusion more diﬃcult? In addition, we can also
explore a new question: If a leniency program does not prevent cartel formation, what is
its impact on the cartel price path?
To engage in this exercise, we draw upon another recent strand of the collusion literature that adapts the classical repeated game model of collusion to allow for a cartel to be
discovered and, in that event, penalties being levied (Harrington, 2004, 2005b; Harrington
and Chen, 2005). This work allows both the probability of detection and penalties to be
endogenous to colluding firms’ prices. A cartel is then modelled as choosing a price path
to maximize the expected present value of profits while taking into account how this price
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path impacts the likelihood of paying penalties and satisfying the usual incentive compatibility constraint ensuring the internal stability of the cartel. A cartel then selects a price
path that ensures compliance from all firms and which tries to avoid raising suspicions
that they are colluding. In that setting, the introduction of a leniency program will impact
the price path through its influence on the incentive compatibility constraints. Leniency
may influence whether or not collusion is stable and, when it is stable, the properties of
the collusive price path.
In sum, this paper brings together two recent strands in the collusive pricing literature
- research that explores the impact of corporate leniency programs and research that
explores the impact of antitrust enforcement on cartel formation and the collusive price
path. In doing so, we generate two primary findings. First, the optimality of a maximally
lenient policy, which has been derived in earlier studies, is shown to be robust to when the
cartel can adjust its price to the leniency policy and when both the probability of detection
and penalties are sensitive to the collusive price path. Second, a policy of partial leniency
- which is in eﬀect in the U.S. - can actually make collusion easier and result in a higher
cartel price path, relative to a policy of no leniency. After laying out the model in Section
2, an optimal collusive price path is defined in Section 3. The impact of leniency programs
is analyzed in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.

2

Model

The model is a special case of that in Harrington (2004) with the exception that we
allow for a corporate leniency program. As the analysis in this paper will be numerical,
functional forms will be specified. For motivation and elaboration of many assumptions,
the reader is referred to Harrington (2005b).
Consider an industry with n ≥ 2 symmetric firms. To keep matters simple, assume the
stage game is the Bertrand price game so that firms oﬀer homogeneous products, make
simultaneous price decisions, and have constant marginal cost, denoted c ≥ 0. Firm i’s
profit when its price is Pi and all other firms charge a common price of P−i is
⎧
⎪
⎪
(Pi − c) (a − bPi )
if Pi < P−i
⎪
⎨
π i (Pi , P−i ) =
(Pi − c) (1/n) (a − bPi ) if Pi = P−i
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ 0
if Pi > P−i

where (a − bP ) is market demand at a price of P and it is assumed a − bc > 0. Of course,

the stage game equilibrium has all firms price at c with associated profit of π
b = 0. Finally,
4

let π (P ) ≡ (P − c) (1/n) (a − bP ) denote a firm’s profit when all firms charge a common
price.
Firms engage in this price game for an infinite number of periods. The setting is
one of perfect monitoring which means firms’ prices over the preceding t − 1 periods are
common knowledge in period t. In this paper, "detection" always refers to a third party,
such as buyers, detecting the existence of a cartel. Assume a firm’s payoﬀ is the expected
discounted sum of its income stream where the common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1) .
If firms form a cartel, they meet to determine price. Assume these meetings, and any
associated documentation, provides the "smoking gun" if an investigation is pursued. The
cartel is detected with some probability and incurs penalties in that event. Assume, for
simplicity, that detection results in the discontinuance of collusion forever. Detection in
period t then generates a terminal payoﬀ of [b
π / (1 − δ)] − X t − F (= −X t − F ) where X t
is a firm’s damages and F is any (fixed) fines (which may include the monetary equivalent
of prison sentences).2 If not detected, collusion continues on to the next period. It is
useful to think of X t + F as a "hidden liability" for a firm which is incurred only in the
event that the cartel is discovered. As we’ll be focusing upon symmetric equilibria, all
firms will have the same damages so there is a single damage state variable.
Damages are assumed to evolve in the following manner:
¡ ¢
X t = βX t−1 + γx P t where β ∈ [0, 1) and γ ≥ 0.

As time progresses, damages incurred in previous periods become increasingly diﬃcult to
document and 1 − β measures the rate of deterioration of the evidence. x (P t ) is the level
of damages incurred by each firm in the current period where γ is the damage multiple
applied. While U.S. antitrust law specifies treble damages, γ is often well less than three
because of out-of-court settlements. X t is to be interpreted as that part of antitrust
penalties that are sensitive to firms’ prices and how long they’ve been colluding. Even
though buyers cannot collect damages in the European Union, X t is still relevant as long
as E.U. penalties are sensitive to cartel behavior. We will use a specification based on
current U.S. antitrust practice:

2 One

¡ ¢ ¡
¢ ¡ ¢
x Pt = Pt − c D Pt

might be bothered that the payoﬀ in the event of detection is negative and thus there is cause

for a firm entering into bankruptcy. However, in most price-fixing cases, colluding firms have multiple
products and collusion takes places in only a subset of those markets. Thus, the total value of the firm
can remain positive even if they are caught colluding in some markets.
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where c is the "but for price," that is, the price that would have occurred but for collusion.
In the special case when the but for price is unit cost, damages equal the additional profits
earned due to collusion.
It is assumed that damages are assessed only in periods of eﬀective collusion. In
particular, this means damages are not assessed in the period that a firm deviates. This has
the useful implication that, at a symmetric equilibrium, all firms have identical damages
and thus there is only one state variable for penalties, X t . If we instead allowed damages to
accumulate in the period that a firm deviated then accumulated damages for the deviator
would diﬀer from that of other firms which would require having a separate damage state
variable for each firm. Our assumption strikes us a reasonable approximation and serves
to reduce the number of state variables.
Successful prosecution of a cartel - by which is meant that penalties are imposed involves multiple stages. First, detection - the creation of suspicions that a cartel has
formed. Some party - for example, buyers - must recognize that, among all of the thousands of industries, this particular one may be plagued by collusion. Second, investigation
- in response to a complaint, the antitrust authority must decide that it is worthwhile to
pursue a case. Third, prosecution - after conducting such an investigation, the antitrust
authority must choose to prosecute the firms (and/or the buyers must decide whether to
pursue civil damages litigation). The focus of our modelling is on detection. Detection of
a cartel can occur from many sources, some of which are related to price - such as customer
complaints - and some of which are unrelated to price - such as internal whistleblowers.
Hay and Kelley (1974) find that detection was attributed to a complaint by a customer
or a local, state, or federal agency in 13 of 49 price-fixing cases. More recently, an investigation which uncovered the graphite electrodes cartel began with a complaint from
a steel manufacturer which is a purchaser of graphite electrodes (Levenstein and Suslow,
2001), and the stainless steel case was launched by buyers complaining to the European
Commission about the rapid increase in prices (Levenstein, Suslow, and Oswald, 2004).
High prices or price increases or simply anomalous price movements may cause customers
to become suspicious and pursue legal action or share their suspicions with the antitrust
authorities. Though it isn’t important for this model, we do imagine that buyers (in many
price-fixing cases, they are industrial buyers) are the ones who may become suspicious
about collusion.
To capture these ideas in a tractable manner, an exogenous probability of detection function is specified that depends on the current and previous periods’ price vec-

6

¡
¢
tors. φ P t , P t−1 is the probability of detection when the cartel is active where P t ≡

(P1t , . . . , Pnt ).3 It is assumed that, in the event of detection, successful prosecution oc¡
¢
curs for sure so φ P t , P t−1 also serves as the probability of paying penalties.4 We will
consider a specification in which detection is sensitive to price changes.5 In light of the

environment being stationary, buyers ought to be more surprised by bigger price increases
as well as bigger price decreases.
With the Bertrand price game formulation, the transaction price in any period is the
lowest price charged. Thus, it is assumed that detection depends on the movement in the
lowest price in the market. Let pt ≡ min {P1t , . . . , Pnt } denote the minimum price in period
t. Making a notational change in the arguments of φ (·), the probability of detection is
specified to be quadratic in the change in the transaction price:
⎧
o
n
¡ t
¢
u
t−1 2
⎪
+
α
−
p
,
1
if pt ≥ pt−1
p
min
α
⎪
0
1
⎪
⎨
¡
¢
φ pt , pt−1 =
⎪
n
o
⎪
⎪
⎩ min α + αd ¡pt − pt−1 ¢2 , 1
if pt < pt−1
0
1

We then allow for an asymmetric response to price increases and price decreases and con¡
¢
sider parameter values such that 0 ≤ αd1 ≤ αu1 . φ pt , pt−1 is assumed to apply to periods

in which firms eﬀectively collude. Cartel discovery may also take place after the cartel

has collapsed. However, in light of the statute of limitations, this post-cartel window of
discovery is bounded. Specifically, we assume, upon discontinuation of collusion, discovery
can occur either in the period of collapse (that is, the period in which a firm deviates) or
the period afterwards.
In the initial period, firms have the choice of forming a cartel, and risking detection and
penalties, or earning non-collusive profit of π
b. If they choose the former, they can, at any

time, choose to discontinue colluding. However, a finitely-lived cartel will cause collusion

to unravel so that, in equilibrium, firms either collude forever or not at all (subject to the
cartel being exogenously terminated because of detection).
In any period during which firms have a chance of being detected, a firm can apply
to the corporate leniency program. This program allows the first firm to come forward

to have a reduction in fines. Specifically, a firm awarded amnesty will only have to pay
3 For

an analysis where φ (·) is derived, see Harrington and Chen (2004).
one can allow the probability of successful prosecution, given detection, to lie between


0 and 1 where this probability is embedded in φ P t , P t−1 .
5 We focus on the dependence of detection on price changes rather than price levels because optimal
4 Alternatively,

cartel price paths are more compelling. For this result as well as further motivation for this detection
technology, see Harrington (2005b).
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a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of the penalties levied, X t + F . θ = 1 captures the absence of any
leniency program, while θ = 0 provides maximal leniency in that all penalties are avoided.
If m firms simultaneously apply for leniency, it is assumed that each has an equal chance
of receiving it, in which case the expected fraction of penalties to be paid is

m−1+θ 6
.
m

Literature Review: Collusion and the Prospect of Cartel Detection An early
work integrating the prospect of detection and penalties into the repeated game model
of collusion is Cyrenne (1999) who modifies Green and Porter (1984) by assuming that
a price war, and the ensuing raising of price after the war, results in detection for sure
and with it a fixed fine. The first work to do so while making the probability of detection
and penalties endogenous to the price path is Harrington (2005b). There the joint profit
maximizing price path is characterized when incentive compatibility constraints are not
binding. Assuming that the probability of detection is sensitive to price changes, the
cartel is shown to gradually raises price with price converging to a steady-state level.
Comparative statics on the steady-state price reveal that it is decreasing in the damage
multiple and the probability of detection but is independent of the level of fixed fines.
Furthermore, if penalties are independent of the price path then the cartel’s steady-state
price is the same as in the absence of antitrust laws. Another intriguing result is that a
more stringent standard for calculating damages increases the steady-state price.
A characterization of the cartel price path when incentive compatibility constraints
bind was conducted in Harrington (2004). Depending on the parameter values, two qualitatively distinct cartel price paths emerged. One is qualitatively the same as in Harrington
(2005b) - the cartel gradually raises price and it converges to a steady-state level. This establishes that the monotonicity of the price path when incentive compatibility constraints
do not bind extends to when they do. The second type of price path has the cartel
gradually raise price but then price declines down to the steady-state. Though reducing
price lowers profit and cannot make detection less likely, a price decline is required so as
to maintain cartel stability. The impact of antitrust laws is also explored and analysis
reveals a potentially perverse eﬀect. Though making price-fixing illegal may induce a
cartel to initially price lower, in some cases it may allow the cartel to eventually price
6 Initially,

we allowed the leniency parameter to vary according to the type of penalty so that a firm

receiving amnesty would pay a penalty of θd X t + θf F where θd , θf ∈ [0, 1] . A motivation for this is that,
in the U.S., amnesty means all government fines are waived but a firm is still liable for single (not treble)
damages. As the initial results did not reveal any interesting distinctions between θd and θf , we chose to
simplify matters and impose a common leniency parameter applicable to all sources of penalties.
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higher ; this is due to how antitrust laws aﬀect incentive compatibility constraints. The
risk of detection and penalties may deter a firm from cheating, out of fear that a price
war may generate suspicions about collusion. Thus, antitrust laws can loosen incentive
compatibility constraints and thereby allow the cartel to set higher prices.
In the previous two papers (and in the current paper), a reduced form specification
was used as the probability of detection was assumed to be increasing in price increases. A
more foundational approach is taken in Harrington and Chen (2004) where buyers’ beliefs
are explicitly modelled and detection occurs when the observed price path is suﬃciently
unlikely in light of buyers’ beliefs. In other words, suspicions emerge when observed
prices are anomalous. The cartel price path is shown to be comprised of two phases.
During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost
shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than
under non-collusion or simple monopoly. Hence, the variance of price is much lower under
collusion; a property consistent with the empirical work of Abrantes-Metz et al (2005).
Furthermore, compared to when firms do not collude, cost shocks take a longer time to
pass-through to price and this results in more serial correlation in prices.7

3

Optimal Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

The cartel’s problem is to choose an infinite price path so as to maximize the expected sum
of discounted income subject to the price path being incentive compatible. In determining
the set of incentive compatible price paths, the assumption is made that deviation from
the collusive path results in the cartel being dissolved and firms behaving according to a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).
Suppose a firm deviates and the cartel collapses. Since cartel meetings are no longer
taking place, the damage variable simply depreciates at the exogenous rate of 1 − β:

X t = βX t−1 .8 This is still a dynamic problem, however, in that price movements can
create suspicions and, while firms are no longer colluding, an investigation could reveal

evidence of past collusion. It is assumed that discovery can occur either in the period
during which a firm deviates or the period afterwards. The state variables at t are last
period’s transaction price, denoted pt−1 , and (common) damages, X t−1 .
7 There

is earlier work which explores the prospect of detection in a static cartel model. These papers

are referenced in Harrington (2005).
8 Recall that we assume damages stop accumulating once collusion breakdowns which begins with the
period in which a firm deviates.
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Given the Bertrand price formulation, it is easy to argue that a MPE must entail all
firms pricing at the stage game equilibrium price of cost.9 Suppose, to the contrary, a
(symmetric) MPE has all firms pricing at P 0 > c in the period after a deviation. By the
usual argument, a firm could produce an n-fold increase in current profit by pricing just
below P 0 . As the change in the current price vector is arbitrarily small, there is almost no
eﬀect on the firm’s future payoﬀ since the change in the probability of detection is small
and the change in the state variable is small. Since pricing a little below P 0 significantly
raises current profit with almost no eﬀect on future profits, it is not an equilibrium.
Therefore, the MPE is infinite repetition of the stage game equilibrium which means the
competitive price.
The cartel’s problem is represented as a constrained dynamic programming problem:

¡
¡
¤
¢
¢£
V pt−1 , X t−1 = max π (P ) − δφ P, pt−1 βX t−1 + γx (P ) + F
P
£
¡
¢
¢¤ ¡
+δ 1 − φ P, pt−1 V P, βX t−1 + γx (P )

(1)

subject to

¡
¤
¢£
π (P ) − δφ P, pt−1 βX t−1 + γx (P ) + F
(2)
£
¡
¢
¢¤
¡
+δ 1 − φ P, pt−1 V P, βX t−1 + γx (P )
≥
½
¡
¢
£
¡
¢¡
¢¤ ¡
¢
max max
nπ (P 0 ) − δφ P 0 , pt−1 βX t−1 + F + δ 1 − φ P 0 , pt−1 W P 0 , βX t−1 ,
0
P <P
¢ª
¡
nπ (P ) − δθ βX t−1 + F .

A solution to (1)-(2) is referred to as an Optimal Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(OSSPE). W is the expected (non-collusive) payoﬀ after a deviation and is defined by:
⎧
⎨ −δφ (c, P 0 ) ¡β 2 X t−1 + F ¢
if θ ≥ φ (c, P 0 )
W =
⎩ −δ ¡ n−1+θ ¢ ¡β 2 X t−1 + F ¢ if θ < φ (c, P 0 )
n

In the incentive compatibility constraint (2), a firm that cheats can choose to apply
¡
¢
for amnesty in which case it pays penalties of θ βX t−1 + F . Since detection is no
9 This

is not generally true and indeed does not hold under many diﬀerentiated products models in

which the firm demand function is continuous. In that case, a firm may price above its static best reply
function in order to reduce the size of the price decrease (from the collusive price) so as to reduce the
chances of detection. This possibility is explored in Harrington (2004). Note that it is then possible
that the MPE payoﬀ could be higher than infinite repetition of the stage game equilibrium profit. What
is required is that the higher profits (from prices being above the static equilibrium levels) more than
compensate for the possibility of paying penalties. Suﬃcient conditions for that to occur are provided in
Harrington (2003).
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longer an issue, it optimally prices so as to maximize current profit which means slightly
undercutting the collusive price of P and earning profit of approximately nπ (P ). This
¡
¢
yields a a payoﬀ of nπ (P ) − δθ βX t−1 + F . Alternatively, it can choose not to use the
leniency program when it cheats. In that case, it may want to price diﬀerently so as to

control the induced series of price decreases. If it deviates by pricing at P 0 then price will
decline by P 0 − pt−1 in the current period and by P 0 − c in the following period. Note
that it faces an expected present value of penalties of
¡
¢
¡
¢
¢¡
£
¡
¢¤
δφ P 0 , pt−1 βX t−1 + F + δ 2 1 − φ P 0 , pt−1 φ (c, P 0 ) β 2 X t−1 + F .

A deviating firm may then want to price lower than just undercutting the collusive price
so that the price path falls more gradually and detection is made less likely.
In defining W , note that, as argued above, equilibrium necessarily entails all firms
pricing at cost. The only issue is whether they apply for leniency (given the deviator
did not already do so). It is always an equilibrium for all firms to apply for leniency.
¡
¢
Given that all other firms do so, a firm reduces expected penalties from δ β 2 X t−1 + F
¡
¢
¢ ¡ 2 t−1
to δ n−1+θ
+ F by doing so itself (where it is assumed that the firm given
β X
n

amnesty is randomly selected). There may also be another equilibrium in which no firm
applies for amnesty. This exists if and only if φ (c, P 0 ) ≤ θ so that the probability of de-

tection is weakly less than the fraction of penalties that must be paid if awarded amnesty.
If the "no one applies for leniency" equilibrium exists, it is assumed that firms achieve it
given it is Pareto superior to the equilibrium in which all firms apply.10
For when there is no corporate leniency program (that is, θ = 1), Harrington (2004)
proves that an OSSPE price path exists, which may either have a cartel formed with
prices above their static equilibrium levels or may involve no cartel formation. It is
straightforward to show that the proof still works when θ < 1.
This modelling of detection is stationary and deterministic and thus is similar to that
in, for example, Spagnolo (2003). The implication is that, in equilibrium, the leniency
program is not used. For if it was used then collusion would end at a known finite date
which would destabilize collusion in the initial period. Though the model of this paper
allows the probability of detection to change over time because of its dependence on the
price path, the probability moves in a deterministic manner so the same logic applies as in
1 0 Note

that φ (c, P 0 ) ≤ θ implies:




−δφ c, P 0 β 2 X t−1 + F > −δ
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n−1+θ
n




 2 t−1
+F .
β X

Spagnolo (2003) and thus the leniency program is not used in equilibrium. This property
is to be contrasted with the models of Motta and Polo (2003) and Harrington (2005a)
where the probability of detection is stochastic. In that case, the leniency program can be
used in equilibrium. Though we believe such a stochastic specification is more compelling,
tractability prevents that level of richness here.
When colluding firms do not anticipate using the leniency program in equilibrium,
leniency operates exclusively through the payoﬀ to cheating in the incentive compatibility constraint. As a deviating firm can receive amnesty from some or all penalties, the
standard argument in previous papers is that the payoﬀ to cheating is (weakly) higher,
while the payoﬀ to colluding is unaﬀected (since firms do not apply for amnesty in equilibrium).11 Hence, leniency programs make cheating relatively more profitable and this
serves to reduce cartel stability.
It is true in this model as well that the possibility of a deviating firm lowering its
penalty through amnesty can raise its payoﬀ and thus make collusion more diﬃcult.
However, there are two points to make. First, the eﬀect is more complex here since the
price a firm charges when it deviates is endogenous and thus can depend on whether or
not it applies for amnesty. If it decides to receive leniency then a deviating firm need
not be concerned about a post-deviation price war triggering detection. As a result, it
can maximize its profit from cheating by just undercutting the collusive price. With this
richer oligopoly model, leniency aﬀects not only the penalties paid by a firm that deviates
but also the profits it receives when it does deviate.
Previous models assume that detection can occur only when firms are colluding. We
depart from this assumption by allowing detection to occur in the period after the cartel’s
collapse (that is, the period after which a firm deviates). This leads us to the second point
which is that expected penalties can be higher when partial leniency is oﬀered, compared
to a policy of no leniency. Suppose a firm that deviates finds it optimal not to use the
leniency program, perhaps because the probability of detection is relatively low (even for
big price decreases). Further suppose that, in the period after the deviation, it is an
equilibrium for all firms to apply for leniency. Of course, if that event was anticipated,
a deviating firm would generally prefer to apply for leniency when it deviates because,
1 1 The

latter property is not true when the probability of detection is stochastic as shown in Motta and

Polo (2003) and Harrington (2005a). In that colluding firms anticipate that they may use leniency in the
future (in the event that the probability of discovery is suﬃciently high), the expected collusive payoﬀ
depends on the leniency program as well. While more leniency raises the expected collusive payoﬀ in
Motta and Polo (2003), it can either raise or lower the expected payoﬀ in Harrington (2005a).
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by doing so, it receives amnesty for sure, while if it waits then it only receives it with
probability

1
n.

The implication of this argument is that a deviating firm may use the

leniency program even though the ensuing payoﬀ is lower than when there is no leniency
program. For some values of θ, it is then possible that leniency reduces the payoﬀ to
cheating and, therefore, it is not immediate that more leniency (a lower value for θ)
reduces cartel stability. This argument, however, only pertains to when θ >> 0. When
θ ' 0 then a deviating firm who applies for leniency pays a penalty close to zero and that
has to be less than what is paid in the absence of a leniency program. Hence, a policy
of maximal leniency necessarily tightens the incentive compatibility constraint relative to
having no leniency program. Whether there is a monotonic relationship - waiving a higher
fraction of penalties under the leniency program makes collusion more diﬃcult to sustain
- is less clear.

4

Numerical Analysis

To begin, let us describe the method used to solve (1)-(2). The price-damage state space
is ∆ ≡ [0, P m ] × [0, γx (P m ) / (1 − β)] , where P m is the simple monopoly price. ∆∗ is
a discretized version of ∆ which is 30 × 30 and thus has 900 states. (1)-(2) is solved

through function iteration on ∆∗ . The value function is approximated by a linear spline
with 30 basis functions and an equal number of interpolation nodes. One specifies an
initial value function and then uses (1)-(2) to produce a new value function for each state
in ∆∗ . Interpolation using a linear spline then produces a new value function defined on
∆. This process is iterated until convergence is achieved where the criterion is the norm
of the diﬀerence of the coeﬃcient vectors between iterations and the tolerance level is
5 × 10−10 .12
There are a total of 12 parameters. Putting aside the leniency parameter, the benchmark parameter configuration is:
a = 100, b = 1, c = 0, δ = .7, β = .9, n = 3
γ

= 1, F = 0, α0 = .05, αu1 = .0032, αd1 = .0016.

Note that the simple monopoly price is 50 and the non-collusive price is 0. We solved both
the unconstrained case, (1), and the constrained case, (1)-(2) for θ = .2. The associated
value and policy functions are shown in Figure 1. For the unconstrained case (and note
1 2 For

details on these numerical methods, see Judd (1999) and Miranda and Fackler (2002).
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that leniency is irrelevant), the policy function is monotonic in the two states. The higher
is the previous period’s transaction price, the higher the cartel can set price in the current
period since the resulting price increase is not as large. As accumulated damages are
smaller, the penalty in the event of discovery is smaller which makes the cartel want to
raise price more. This reflects the trade-oﬀ from a bigger price increase: A higher current
profit but a lower future payoﬀ since the probability of detection and accumulated damages
are higher.
Turning to the solution to the constrained problem, the policy function is similar except
when last period’s price is relatively high and damages are relatively low; for those states,
the incentive compatibility constraint is violated so firms set the stage game equilibrium
price of zero. When price is relatively high, firms have an incentive to cheat in order to
earn higher current profit. In order to counteract that incentive, the cartel must lower
price significantly. But if that occurs then the probability of detection is high - since
there is a large price decrease - in which case the expected future lifetime is short and
that induces firms to cheat. As a result, there is no collusive price that is stable and so
the policy function prescribes a price equal to cost. However, when damages are high,
firms are so concerned about not inducing detection that this stifles the incentive to cheat
and thus collusion can be maintained even if the inherited price is rather high. Note that
price also tends to be lower near the interface of these two regions - the region for which
collusion collapses and the region for which the incentive compatibility constraint doesn’t
bind so the unconstrained solution can be sustained. Around that interface, the incentive
compatibility constraint can be satisfied but only by pricing below the unconstrained
solution.
To explore the eﬀect of the leniency policy on cartel behavior, (1)-(2) was solved
for all θ ∈ {0, .1, . . . , 1} . With initial conditions of the cartel’s price equalling the noncollusive price and damages equalling zero, we then determined whether cartel formation
was optimal and, if it was, the optimal cartel price path. The analysis showed that (2) is
unaﬀected by θ when θ ≥ .3. We then solved (1)-(2) for a finer grid: θ ∈ {0, .01, . . . , .3} .
Cartel formation was found to be unsustainable when θ < .18. For .18 ≤ θ, firms are able
to form a cartel. When .26 ≤ θ, firms form a cartel and the resulting cartel price path
is very close to the unconstrained optimum so the leniency program is having a minimal
eﬀect or perhaps no eﬀect at all as a deviating firm would not use it. Figure 2 then focuses
on the cartel price path for θ ∈ {.18, .20, . . . , .24}. The price path steadily rises as firms
balance oﬀ higher profit and a higher chance of getting caught in determining the rate at
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which to increase price. Note that it converges to a steady-state level which is below the
simple monopoly price of 50.13 As the policy becomes more lenient - so that more fines
are waived to the first firm to come forward (that is, θ is reduced) - the cartel price path
shifts down. Though the steady-state price is left unaﬀected, it takes a longer time for
the cartel to reach it. As θ is lowered, the incentive to cheat becomes stronger - as a firm
that cheats can acquire amnesty and avoid a larger portion of penalties - and the cartel
must respond by lowering price so as to ensure that cheating is not optimal.
The next exercise characterizes the eﬀect of leniency on cartel formation by deriving
the minimum discount factor at which a cartel forms. For both θ = .3 and θ = 1, (1)-(2)
was solved for all δ ∈ {0, .01, . . . , .99, 1}. For both leniency parameter values, a cartel
formed only when δ ≥ .66. We inferred that this is true for all θ ≥ .3 and then focused on
θ < .3. For each θ ∈ {0, .01, . . . , .29} , (1)-(2) was solved for a low value of δ and re-solved
for a progressively higher value of δ until cartel formation emerged. Figure 3 reports the
results. The minimum discount factor rises with the extent of leniency until the discount
factor has to be at least .86 when there is maximal leniency. Waiving a higher fraction of
fines makes it more diﬃcult for a cartel to form. These results support earlier theoretical
findings, in the context of a Prisoners’ Dilemma, that more leniency makes collusion more
diﬃcult.
Similar exercises were performed for other parameter configurations. Figure 4 reports
results for n = 4 and δ = .8, Figure 5 for n = 5 and δ = .85, and Figure 6 for n = 6
and δ = .9. The same pattern emerges: a more lenient policy (lower θ) causes the cartel
price path to shift down. In addition, when θ is suﬃciently low then a cartel does not
form. Though not reported here, the property in Figure 3 also holds: cartel formation
is more diﬃcult when there is more leniency. Figures 7 and 8 report results for a higher
damage multiple and a lower minimum value to the probability of detection. Figure 7 has
γ = 2 and α0 = .04, while Figure 8 has γ = 3 and α0 = .03. The same qualitative results
emerge.
In sum, results thus far show that when leniency is suﬃciently great, firms are unable to
1 3 As

explained in Harrington (2004), this arises for two reasons. First, a cartel will not want to set the

monopoly price as long as penalties are sensitive to that price. By marginally lowering price below the
monopoly price, there is no first-order eﬀect on current profit but there is a first-order eﬀect in reducing
damages. However, if the only penalty is a fixed fine, then this force is not operative so the cartel would
indeed want to price at the simple monopoly price. Second, even if the cartel wants to price at the
simple monopoly price it may not be able to because the incentive to cheat is too great and thus incentive
compatibility constraints are violated. This induces them to set a lower steady-state price.
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form a cartel. When it is suﬃciently mild, firms cartelize and leniency has no eﬀect since a
deviating firm would not use it. For an intermediate range of leniency parameter values, a
cartel forms but the price path is shifted down in response to a higher fraction of penalties
being waived. It follows from these lower prices that the value to colluding is lower when
the leniency program is stronger (that is, the fraction of fines waived is larger). These
results are consistent with the cartel-destabilizing eﬀects of leniency programs found, for
example, by Motta and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2003).
The next set of results tell a diﬀerent story. When the probability of detection is
weak, the provision of partial leniency can serve to enhance collusion, though maximal
leniency continues to make cartel formation more diﬃcult. For purposes of comparison,
let us report the value to forming a cartel under the benchmark parameter configuration.
Figure 9 shows that value which is the value function evaluated at the initial conditions,
that is, the expected present value of the profit stream from forming a cartel. (Keep in
mind that the non-collusive value is zero.) Consistent with the price path shifting down
when θ is reduced, the collusive value is lower when there is a more generous leniency
policy. More leniency is making collusion less profitable. Figure 9 also reports the value
of forming a cartel when there is no leniency program. Note that the two values - with
and without a leniency program - converge when leniency is suﬃciently weak which is due
to leniency not having an impact as it is not used.

¡
¢
Let us now reduce the probability of detection by setting αu1 , αd1 = (.00032, .00016) ,

while maintaining all other benchmark parameter values. The resulting value to colluding

is reported in Figure 10. When θ ≤ .16 and thus a suﬃciently high fraction of penalties is
waived, a leniency program has the desired impact of preventing cartel formation. Notice
that the value to colluding is positive in the absence of leniency so a cartel would form
otherwise. When θ = .18, a cartel forms but the collusive value is around 1000 and thus
lower than when there is no leniency when it is over 1300. In that case, partial leniency is
making deviation more attractive and this reduces the cartel price path and thus lowers
the value to colluding. However, for θ ∈ {.22, .24} , the value to forming a cartel is actually
higher when a leniency program is in place. This must be due to the possibility that firms
will apply for leniency after the cartel collapses and this serves to raise expected penalties
from cheating.
To see the argument, suppose a firm that deviates would prefer not to apply for
amnesty because the probability of detection is relatively low given its optimal deviation
price. What is possible, however, is that, in the period after deviation, it is an equilibrium
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for all firms to apply for leniency. The reason is that firms reduce price to marginal cost
and this sharp price drop results in a suﬃciently large probability of detection so as to
make it optimal for a firm to apply for leniency given all other firms do not. Hence, the
only equilibrium has all firms applying for leniency after the cartel collapses. Of course, a
firm that is contemplating a deviation would anticipate this event and apply for leniency
itself when it deviates. By doing so, it receives amnesty for sure, while if it waits then it
only receives it with probability

1
n.

The implication of this argument is that a deviating

firm may use the leniency program even though its payoﬀ is lower compared to when
there is no leniency program. The presence of a leniency program then raises expected
penalties when a firm cheats and this reduces the payoﬀ to cheating, loosens the incentive
compatibility constraint, and allows the cartel to set higher prices. The resulting higher
cartel price path is depicted in Figure 11 for θ = .22.
Contrary to our earlier findings and to much of the literature, partial leniency programs
- so that some but not all penalties are waived - can enhance the attractiveness of forming
a cartel. What is robust is that maximal leniency always serves to destabilize cartels.
Though the policy of the European Commission is one of maximal leniency to the first
firm to come forward, it is only partial leniency in the U.S. The U.S. program waives all
government penalties but cartel members are still liable for private customer damages and
thus the program is eﬀectively one of partial leniency. Recently, the Antitrust Criminal
Penalty Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004 expanded leniency in that a firm is now
only liable for single, rather than the usual treble, damages (which corresponds to a lower
value for γ for the firm that enters the leniency program). Still, leniency remains partial
though is now closer to maximal leniency.

5

Summary

A major challenge to stopping cartels is that they are shrouded in secrecy. The corporate
leniency program works to break the code of silence among cartel members. Research
exploring the eﬀect of such programs grows as more countries adopt them and as more
convictions are attributed to the existence of such programs.
This study brings together two recent strands of the collusive pricing literature. One
strand explores the impact of corporate leniency programs using a very simple specification
in which oligopolistic interaction is modelled as a Prisoners’ Dilemma and both the penalty
and probability of detection are exogenous to cartel behavior. This simple oligopolistic
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structure implies that a leniency program can have an impact only by deterring cartel
formation; it cannot influence the price path in the event of cartel formation as only one
collusive price is presumed feasible. The second strand explores the impact of antitrust
enforcement on collusive pricing by modifying the classical repeated game setting so as
to allow detection of the cartel - by buyers or authorities - to be sensitive to the price
path. Blending these two strands, this paper investigates the impact of a leniency program
when the cartel can manipulate the price path so as to influence the likelihood of detection
and penalties in the event of detection. Thus, the analysis is able to describe how such
programs influence the cartel price path as well cartel formation.
Through numerical analysis, several conclusions are drawn. First, we found that, consistent with earlier results, maximal leniency programs (whereby all penalties are waived
to the first firm to come forward) necessarily makes collusion more diﬃcult. Second, in
most (but not all) cases, the collusive value of cartel is lower when there is a more generous
leniency policy (that is, a higher fraction of penalties are waived). A more lenient program
provides a stronger incentive for a cartel member to cheat as it can avoid penalties by
simultaneously applying for amnesty when it undercuts the collusive price. This tightens
the incentive compatibility constraint which induces the cartel to price lower. Hence, even
if a leniency program is unsuccessful in deterring cartel formation, it may still be able
to cause the cartel to price lower in order to maintain cartel stability. The third result
provides a caveat to the result just mentioned in that partial leniency programs (such
as is used in the U.S.) can have a perverse eﬀect on antitrust enforcement. When the
probability of detection is weak, the collusive value can be higher when a partial leniency
program is put in place (compared to oﬀering no leniency program). In response to a
firm cheating, firms may excessively use the leniency program and, given that only one
firm can receive amnesty, expected penalties can actually be higher with partial leniency.
This serves to reduce the payoﬀ to cheating which permits the cartel to sustain a higher
price path. Leniency programs can then have subtle perverse eﬀects though, on net, our
analysis suggests that they do indeed tend to make collusion more diﬃcult.

References
[1] Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., Luke M. Froeb, John F. Geweke, and Christopher T. Taylor,
“A Variance Screen for Collusion,” Federal Trade Commission, March 2005.

18

[2] Aubert, Cécile, Patrick Rey, and William Kovacic, “The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels,” University of Toulouse, November 2003.
[3] Cyrenne, Philippe, “On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behavior,” Review of Industrial Organization, 14 (1999), 257-272.
[4] Feess, Eberhard and Markus Walzl, “An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs
and Lessons to Learn for US and EU Policies,” University of Maastricht, September
2004.
[5] Green, E. and Porter, R.H. “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica, Vol. 52 (1984), pp. 87-100.
[6] Harrington, Joseph E. Jr., “Some Implications of Antitrust Laws for Cartel Pricing,”
Economics Letters, 79 (2003), 377-383.
[7] Harrington, Joseph E. Jr., “Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust
Authority,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (2004), 651-673.
[8] Harrington, Joseph E. Jr., “Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs,” Johns Hopkins
University, March 2005a.
[9] Harrington, Joseph E. Jr., “Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust
Authority,” International Economic Review, 46 (2005b), 145-169.
[10] Harrington, Joseph E. Jr. and Joe Chen, “Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection,” Johns Hopkins University, December 2004
(International Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming).
[11] Hay, George and Daniel Kelly, “An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 17 (1974), 13-38.
[12] “Hard Core Cartels,” OECD Report, 2003.
[13] Judd, Kenneth L., Numerical Methods in Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press, 1999.
[14] Kobayashi, Bruce H., “Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations,” George Washington Law Review, 69 (2001), 715-744.

19

[15] Levenstein, Margaret and Valerie Suslow, “Private International Cartels and Their
Eﬀect on Developing Countries,” University of Massachusetts, pdf copy, 2001.
[16] Levenstein, Margaret C., Valerie Y. Suslow, and Lynda J. Oswald, “Contemporary
International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Eﬀects and Implications
for Competition Policy,” Antitrust Law Journal, 71 (2004), 801-852.
[17] Miranda, Mario J. and Paul L. Fackler, Applied Computational Economics and Finance, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002.
[18] Motchenkova, Evguenia, “The Eﬀects of Leniency Programs on the Behavior of the
Firms Participating in Cartel Agreements,” Tilburg University, 2004.
[19] Motta, Massimo and Michele Polo, “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (2003), 347-379.
[20] Spagnolo, Giancarlo, “Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against
Cartels and Organized Crime,” University of Mannheim, March 2003.

20

Figure 1. Benchmark Parameter Specification

Figure 2. Simulated Price Paths
Benchmark Parameter Specification
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Figure 8. Simulated Price Paths
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Figure 9. Collusive Value: Benchmark Parameter Specification

Figure 10. Collusive Value: Weak Probability of Detection

Figure 11 Simulated Price Paths: Weak Probability of Detection
( θ = .22 )
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